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Abstract: In 2005, historian David R. Roediger published the now-classic Working 
Toward Whiteness: How America’s Immigrants Became White in which he recounts 
how immigrant minorities in the early 20th century secured their place in the “white 
race” in order to qualify as fully American and be treated with fairness and respect. 
Muslim immigrants from the Middle-East were no exception to the process described. 
However, becoming white was a particularly long and arduous journey which even-
tually led to the 1978 Office of Management Budget directive officially categorizing 
Middle-Eastern immigrants as white. But the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
sparked new alliances between the various ethnic groups that make up the US Muslim 
community: Arabs, African-Americans or South-East Asians from all walks of life 
have joined forces in resisting discrimination and bigotry. Thus, the question arises 
whether common cultural heritage or faith should be the main force shaping a new 
collective and visible identity. Also, such process entails a questioning of hierarchies 
based on socioeconomic status; compared to their African-American coreligionists, 
American citizens of Arab descent fare much better in terms of education and wealth. 
The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of 9/11 on the way Arab-
American Muslims and their community leaders re-define the boundaries of their col-
lective identity and how they forge bonds of solidarity with indigenous Muslims. It 
seeks to address two related questions: How do Arab-American Muslims relate to the 
black-white dualist model or racial binary? What role does class identification play 
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in structuring social relations between Arab and African-American Muslims? While 
I do not negate the fact that in the US race continues to play a fundamental role in 
structuring social relations, I argue that it is important to pay close attention to how 
socioeconomic status may condition the formulation of a group identity.  
Keywords: American Islam, race, collective identity, Americanness
In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, some American Muslim leaders 
felt it was “the best of times”1 to clear up misrepresentations about their 
community and to demonstrate their loyalty to the United States. As they 
refused to get drawn into the “us versus them” scenario, activists promoted 
interreligious dialogue and organized conferences to highlight the similari-
ties between Islamic and American values. In response to the dramatic spike 
in hate crimes, protest demonstrations were staged at which participants 
carried banners proclaiming: “Muslims and Christians worship the same 
God” (MAC 2002). Moreover, because unity creates strength, intellectuals 
and community leaders of immigrant origin actively encouraged coalition 
building, as illustrated by this statement in 2001 by Mervat Hatem, the 
president of the Middle East Studies Association: “Muslim politics have 
shifted to thinking beyond immediate needs or distinct needs of distinct 
Muslim racial/ethnic communities” (quoted in Naber 2012, 150). Indeed, 
the emphasis on cohesion building naturally led advocacy groups to sup-
port the political mobilization of American Muslims in order to produce 
a national unified agenda. Shifting the discursive frame from parochial to 
broader interests represented a suitable strategy towards political cohesive-
ness and effective mobilization. This nascent pursuit for empowerment 
caught the attention of political observers and even prompted some to an-
nounce the birth of a Muslim lobby.2 In fact, the sense of being besieged, a 
condition brought upon by hate violence and negative media images, all but 
encouraged, it seemed, the strengthening of communal sentiments and the 
uniting of all American Muslims, both immigrants and natives.
However, the year 2001 was coincidentally marked by a dramatic in-
1 When asked about the fate of the Arab/Muslim community in the US after 9/11, Mary Rose Oakar, Presi-
dent of the Arab-American Antidiscrimination Committee, famously quoted Dickens’s opening line: 
“These are the best of times and the worst of times.”
2 Neo-conservative theologian Richard John Neuhaus was one of George W. Bush’s informal advisors and 
postulated the existence of a well-structured Muslim lobby in an article entitled “One Nation Under Many 
Gods,” published in October 2001 in the religious journal First Things.
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crease in immigration from countries where Islam is the predominant reli-
gion: more Muslims immigrated to America in 2001 than in any other year 
since 1992, according to the Pew Research Center (2011, 13). Whereas the 
Hart-Celler Act of 1965 had made it easier for people from present day 
Lebanon, Syria and Jordan to settle in the US, in 2001 new contingents of 
immigrants were added to the stream with many coming from countries in 
South-East Asia, Africa or Eastern Europe. As a result, indigenous African-
American adherents to Islam were soon confronted with alternative defini-
tions of what being a Muslim means.
Hence, at the beginning of the new century, two contradictory dynamics 
were simultaneously at work; on the one hand, anti-Muslim sentiment en-
couraged the forging of a stronger collective identity, but on the other hand 
the Muslim community was becoming even more ethnically and culturally 
diverse.
Despite the optimistic discourse of Muslim advocacy organizations, one 
may ask whether, a decade and a half after the tragedy, civic and religious 
leaders have actually managed to establish bonds of community and de-
velop a genuine and cohesive American Muslim identity or American um-
mah (the Muslim community at large). In view of the number of terrorist 
acts which have been carried out in the US since 2001, one would indeed 
tend to believe in a continued and growing effort towards collective ac-
tion. However, the definition of a common agenda requires overcoming 
the racial and cultural divide between a great variety of immigrants and 
African-American Muslims, as much as it requires maintaining multiracial 
alliances. These questions have been the subject of a wealth of scholarly 
research. While some studies have focused on the emergence of a national 
Islamic leadership (Sirin and Fine 2008, Nimer 2002), others have inves-
tigated the difficulties encountered by community leaders in maintaining 
a unified American ummah (McCloud 1995). Still others have studied the 
tension between universalism and particularism and highlighted the vitality 
of African-American Islam (Curtis 2002, Chande, 2008). But the dominant 
narrative of the Islamic faith in America is still that it is primarily a Middle-
Eastern phenomenon. In fact, and even more so since 9/11, the public me-
dia and political discourse tend to conflate Arab and Muslim identities and 
subsequently erase the African-American Muslim experience. This article 
seeks to contribute to the literature by studying how immigrants from the 
Arab world in particular and African-American Muslims interact to define 
what constitutes American Islam in the post-9/11 era. Because the shaping 
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of a collective identity implies the existence of commonalities and shared 
beliefs, I will discuss attitudes and social practices in the context of the 
mosque after a brief introductory section on the organizational aspects of 
mosque life in the US. The third part will be dedicated to an examination of 
the political implication of mosque-goers as well as the voting behavior of 
the two subgroups in question.
My analysis will draw mainly on data from two different surveys that 
were released in 2001 and 2011: “The Mosque in America: A National Por-
trait” (2001), conducted by Dr. Ihsan Bagby, Associate Professor of Islamic 
Studies at the University of Kentucky and sponsored by the Council on 
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), based in Washington, DC, and “The 
American Mosque 2011: Basic Characteristics of the American Mosque, 
Attitudes of Mosque Leaders,” also carried out by Ihsan Bagby and spon-
sored by various associations such as the Hartford Seminary or the Islamic 
Circle of North America. Although the results are only comparable in a lim-
ited sense as the questions asked were not exactly the same in their word-
ing, both studies provide a detailed examination of how relations between 
the Arab and African-American Muslim subgroups have evolved over the 
past decade.3 Ultimately this contribution aims at providing insights on the 
issues surrounding the definition of “Muslim-Americanness” in the post 
9/11 landscape.
Organizational Aspects and Dynamics
All studies concur that the majority of American Muslims today are for-
eign-born. More than 60% of US Muslims are immigrants, according to the 
Pew Research Center data (2011, 13). In terms of regional origins, four out 
of every ten Muslim immigrants to the US are from the Middle-East - North 
Africa region (Pew Research Center 2007, 7). The rest are from South-
Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and elsewhere. However, indigenous Af-
rican-American Muslims still constitute roughly a third of the whole (Pew 
Research Center 2011, 16). Because the US Census Bureau does not collect 
religion membership data, there are no official statistics on the number of 
3 The two surveys which serve as a database for this study focus on the basic demographics, administration 
and vitality of American mosques. In addition, the surveys (which involved nearly one thousand telephone 
interviews) included a set of questions on the attitudes of Mosque leaders to America and involvement in 
American society. 
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Muslims in the US. Estimates range from 3.3 million in 2016 (Mohamed 
2016, 1) to as many as 7 million (Council on American-Islamic Relations, 
2015). The majority (65%) identifies with Sunni Islam, while 11% iden-
tify with the Shi’a tradition. Most African-American Muslims adhere to 
mainstream Islam and many have followed the teachings of Imam W. Deen 
Mohammed (until his death in 2008). However, another large portion of Af-
rican-Americans belongs to a second current whose avowed goal is to cre-
ate “a more authentic and normative form of Islam” (Bagby 2006, 27). In 
addition, there are other sectarian groups such as the Sufi and Ahmadiyyas, 
as well as the more unorthodox religious tradition of the Nation of Islam.4 
Recently published figures show that, in the past decades, immigration 
from Muslim countries has increased significantly. As reported by the Pew 
Research Center, the total number of immigrants doubled from roughly 
50,000 people a year in 1992 to 100,000 in 2012 (Mohamed 2016, 1). As 
a consequence, the number of places of worship in the US has increased at 
a tremendous rate. The 2011 Mosque Survey estimates that the number of 
mosques rose from 1,209 in 2000 to 2,106 in 2010, a 74% increase which 
implies that 80% of the houses of worship were built within the last twelve 
years (Bagby 2011, 5). 
Understandably, as disparate peoples with different interpretations of 
Islam and ideological beliefs come together, one would expect congre-
gations to be primarily shaped by identification with a particular cultural 
heritage. When asked about the cultural divide, the mosque leaders who 
were interviewed in 2001 and 2011 claimed that their congregations were 
in fact becoming more ethnically diverse. It was reported that only 3% of 
all mosques in 2011 had only one ethnic group that attended the mosque—
compared to 7% in 2001 (Bagby 2001, 3/ 2011, 4). That being said, the 
reports also show that three-fourths of all mosques are still dominated by 
one major ethnic group: Arab, African-American or South Asian. Hence, 
it seems that Bagby’s conclusions need to be tempered. Indeed, many 
mosques, and some of the largest in the US, are still clearly divided along 
ethnic lines. For example, the Islamic Center of Detroit, which is said to be 
“at the intersection between all the different communities”, has no African-
Americans on its board (Adil 2009, 1). Similarly, the Diyanet Center of 
America, a 20,200-square-foot mosque and cultural center that was inau-
4 For a complete overview, see Y. Y. Haddad and J. I. Smith, eds., Muslim Communities in North America 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994).
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gurated in 2016 in Lanham, Maryland by Turkish president Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, is also known as the Turkish American Community Center. Al-
though the center was built “to serve as bridge between communities,” ac-
cording to Turkey’s head of Religious Affairs Dr. Mehmet Gormez (Ileri 
2016, 1), some critics feel that its construction serves the purpose of export-
ing a Turkish style of Islam and thus competing with Middle-Eastern ritual 
practices (Elass 2015, 1). 
However, if in reality a cultural divide sometimes opposes immigrant 
subgroups, both the 2001 and 2011 reports conclude that African-American 
mosques are more likely than immigrant mosques to cater to a non-mixed 
audience. In some of those mosques, 90% of worshippers are African-Amer-
ican (Bagby 2011, 4). Of course, the residential patterns of congregation 
members are greatly determined by socioeconomic differences. But over 
the last 10 years, economic disparities have widened considerably (Sharp 
2013, 1048). As a result, Muslim congregations in urban and suburban areas 
are inevitably divided along racial and social lines. Compared with other 
subgroups, immigrants from the Arab world fare better in terms of income, 
education and employment, many of them having settled in the US after 
completing a university degree or a professional training program. Most 
are thus well-educated with relatively high annual median incomes. For 
that reason, these first- and second-generation immigrants have integrated 
rather well socially and economically. Conversely, the socioeconomic sta-
tus of African-American Muslims is similar to that of their ethnic group in 
the overall non-Muslim population. A study conducted in 1999 indicated 
that the median family income for black Muslims amounted to $32,000 cor-
responding roughly to that of the larger African-American group but far be-
hind the more than $50,000 earned by the average American family (Karim 
2009, 38). As historian Simon Reich puts it: “African Americans remain the 
most disillusioned segment of the US Muslim population” (2010, 6). 
Therefore, while African-Americans in general live and pray in urban 
centers, immigrants have generally settled in suburbs or ethnic enclaves. 
The situation in Detroit is a clear illustration of these ethnically and eco-
nomically determined boundaries between groups. Muhammad’s Mosque 
and Masjid Al Haqq, for example, are both located in a predominantly black 
neighborhood and consequently cater to the needs of African-American 
Muslims. But Masjid Al-Salaam, in Dearborn Michigan, which is part of 
the Detroit metropolitan area, was built in a suburb where more than 30% 
of the population is Arab-American. As Jamillah Karim’s research demon-
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strates: “This residential division, often spoken of as an inner-city versus 
a suburban division, is a major theme in intra-ummah discussions” (2009, 
40). One direct consequence of this socio-economic gap is that African-
American mosques are not economically as sound as immigrant mosques 
and tend to have lower budgets. Only 15% of African-American mosques 
have a budget of $100,000 or more compared with 47% of Middle-Eastern 
mosques. In addition, as a result of deindustrialization and out migration, 
African-American mosques have, overall, the lowest rate of increase: on 
average, the number of participants in all mosques increased between 2001 
and 2011 but African-American mosques have the lowest percentage of 
increase (Bagby 2001, 2011).
If social and economic disparities may explain the ethnic cleavage, many 
authors, however, underline the impact of religious or ritualistic dissension. 
As soon as new immigrants settled into their new lives, it became clear to 
them that the kind of Islam practiced by African-Americans did not con-
form to Middle-Eastern rites. Some of the rites adopted by African-Ameri-
can Muslims were simply incompatible with the type of religious practices 
they were accustomed to. As early as 1998, in a book titled Muslims on the 
Americanization Path?, two leading scholars, Yvonne Y. Haddad and John 
L. Esposito, had already pointed out the delicate coexistence of competing 
Islamic rituals and practices:
 
Some in the African-American community have become increasingly sensitive to im-
migrants who insist on including regional cultural preferences as an essential part of 
the definition of Islam and set themselves up as arbiters of Islamic norms and of what it 
means to be Muslim. (37)
What thus seems evident is that the influx of immigrants has not only drasti-
cally changed the demographics of the Muslim community; it has indeed 
challenged homegrown Muslim practices. 
Attitudes and Social Practices
Islam’s sacred book was revealed in Arabic. Consequently, worshippers are 
expected to memorize and recite the scriptures in their original form, re-
gardless of their native tongue. Although the language used in the Qur’an 
is very complex and does not resemble modern Arabic, those whose origins 
are from the Middle-East obviously have an advantage. Being generally un-
familiar with Arabic, African-American Muslims find it difficult to estab-
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lish bonds of community with the more linguistically-trained adherents. So, 
in mosques where Middle-Easterners form a majority, the Salat al Jumu’ah 
or Friday prayer is often delivered in Arabic, a practice which further alien-
ates African-American Muslims. In fact, the language spoken within the 
walls of the mosque greatly affects attendance across all subgroups. For 
that reason, a significant generational divide has gradually strained rela-
tionships between older immigrants and their native-born and US educated 
offspring. Many report feeling estranged from the local congregation. A 
documentary by film director Ahmed Eid and titled “Unmosqued” (2013) 
reveals that language illiteracy sometimes forces younger Muslims of im-
migrant or African-American origin to pray at home instead of attending a 
service delivered in a language they do not fully understand. 
But beyond linguistic issues, there are more contentious matters that tend 
to hinder the various subgroups of achieving the ideal unified community. 
Gender issues, to start with, have stirred debate. A Pew Research Survey 
published in 2011 indicates that, compared with other Muslims, American 
Muslims overall are more supportive of the role of women in the soci-
ety (17). However, there are some striking differences between women’s 
roles in black and Middle-Eastern mosques. According to Bagby, in most 
African-American mosques, men and women do not pray separately. Only 
39% of those mosques use curtains or partitions to separate worshippers by 
gender, while 70% of Arab mosques do (2001, 48). Similarly, the role given 
to women differs from one community to the other. Female participation 
is encouraged in African-American mosques with 80% of them allowing 
women on their boards (Bagby 2001, 57). In fact, pioneering challenges 
to sex-segregation have been developed by African-American Muslim fe-
male leaders. One of the most famous achievements was Aminah Wahud’s 
historic prayer service in 2005. Now a specialist in gender and Qur’anic 
studies, Dr. A. Wahud was born to a Methodist family but converted to 
Islam while pursuing a higher education. She has been described by fellow 
scholars as one the most influential proponents of “gender jihad” in the 
Muslim world.5 
But, as a majority of observers have convincingly argued, the race ques-
tion is maybe the most critical among the various dimensions of inequality. 
For instance, Beverly Aminah McCloud contends that: “There is no racism 
5 The expression was first used in her 2006 book title: Inside the Gender Jihad: Women’s Reform in Islam 
(Oxford: One World Publication).
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in Islam, but there is plenty among American Muslims” (1994, 74). More re-
cently, in her book, American Muslim Women (2008), Jamillah Karim writes, 
“The pursuit for acceptance causes immigrants to differentiate themselves 
from blacks and also drives them to perceive and treat blacks with a scorn 
taught by the dominant racial discourse” (28). Indeed, for Middle-Eastern 
immigrants becoming “white” has been a goal ever since the first contingents 
started settling in North America. Because in the 19th century newcomers 
from the Levant were classified as “Asian,” they were not eligible to become 
citizens. For almost a century, various successive naturalization cases issued 
contradictory decisions. In 1915, the Dow vs. United States decision ruled 
that immigrants from the Levant were white. But in 1942, a Michigan Dis-
trict court denied citizenship to a Yemenite petitioner on the ground that he 
was Muslim and, as consequence, non-white. Eventually, a 1977 Office of 
Management and Budget directive established that: “A person having origins 
in any of the original peoples of Europe, North Africa, or the Middle East” 
would now be classified as white (quoted in Loue 2006, 27). 
The apparent determination of Arab-Americans to gain “honorary white-
ness” has obviously been interpreted by African-American Muslims not 
only as inferential anti-black racism but also as heretical and blatantly in 
contradiction to the teachings of the Qur’an, which purportedly recognizes 
equality and rejects racial discrimination. Although African-American pro-
to-Islamic leaders had advocated racial separatism that part of their theol-
ogy was actually abandoned over time. Upon returning from his pilgrimage 
to Mecca, Malcolm X embraced the color-blind perspective of orthodox 
Islam and declared: “American needs to understand Islam because this is 
the one religion that erases from its society the race problem” (quoted in 
Hall 2003, 229). This was the beginning of a movement towards Islamic 
orthodoxy, leading to Warith Deen Muhammad’s bringing the community 
into line with Sunni Islam and rejecting in the late 1970’s his predecessors’ 
anti-white theology. Yet, despite the African-American community’s new 
adherence to mainstream Islam, anti-black racism still pervades Muslim 
institutions and mosques. In order to address the multiple and intersecting 
forms of segregation, a group of community leaders and scholars founded 
in 2014 a new organization named MuslimARC (The Muslim Anti-Racism 
Collaborative), which specifically deals with racial justice and issues of 
anti-blackness. Focusing on education, outreach and advocacy, the organi-
zation seeks, despite antagonistic trends, to build “multi-ethnic coalitions 
for racial equity” (MuslimARC 2016, 1). 
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However, some African-American Muslim leaders today are questioning 
and challenging the common dialectic between immigrant and indigenous 
Islam. Sherman Jackson, for instance, specializes in Islamic law and feels 
that the move to Sunni Islam has dislocated African-American Muslims’ 
ability to address the specific needs and problems affecting the black com-
munity. In addition, when orthodox Sunni Islam became the basis of au-
thority, Blackamericans (a coinage by S. Jackson) were relegated to the 
status of second class Muslims: “The false universals invoked by many im-
migrant and overseas Muslims […] exclude Blackamerican concerns and 
simply assume them to be subsumed under the models settled on in the 
Muslim world” (Jackson 2009, 3). Therefore Jackson feels that African-
American Muslims should become more proficient in the religious sciences 
of Sunni tradition and speak out with a distinctively black American voice. 
In other words, he considers that Black Islam is a thoroughly American 
phenomenon that does not need the approval of immigrant Arab Muslims.
The large numbers of immigrants who settled in the US in the last de-
cades of the 20th century brought with them new religious traditions and 
practices which eventually disrupted the established patterns of African-
American Islam. Because religious institutions play a significant role in 
the political mobilization of citizens, let us now turn to a brief analysis of 
national policy issues: how does the divide between Middle-Eastern and 
African-American Muslims affect the formulation of a common political 
agenda?
Political Implication and Voting Habits
Many studies have shown that religiosity (measured by service attendance) 
has, what Ruiter and De Graaf call, a “spill-over effect” on the political 
mobilization of citizens (2006, 1). This phenomenon suggests that reli-
gious volunteering often leads to more political engagement. According to 
Ihsan Bagby’s surveys, Arab and African-American mosques contrast in 
the way their congregants engage in political activities. The answers show 
that, although the overwhelming majority of American Muslims feel that 
they should be involved in politics, black Muslims are less likely to share 
that feeling: 23% of black leaders disagree with the idea that Muslims 
should participate in the political process while only 2% of Arab lead-
ers share that opinion (Bagby 2001, 33). Another study by Amaney Jamal 
from Princeton University concludes that: “The African American mosque 
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participation is not channeled to political ends” (2005, 535). Various ex-
planations have been proposed to account for the fact that African-Amer-
ican Muslims are apparently reluctant to engage in politics. Jamal, for ex-
ample, claims that the long history of discrimination against blacks has 
marginalized the community and “stifled political participation” (2005, 
536). When asked about the current disengagement of African-American 
mosques, one leader answered: “Politics has won little for poor people and 
has not changed the basic plight of African-Americans. We believe that 
political involvement entails compromise and corruption of one’s prin-
ciples and dignity” (quoted in Strum 2005, 32). Another study by Karen 
Isaksen Leonard confirms that African-American Muslims have often re-
mained skeptical of the political process: “[African-Americans] often hold 
ambivalent or antagonistic views toward the US government. Because Is-
lam is seen as a defense against racism many African-American Muslims 
argue that asabiyya (group solidarity and experience) must be given pri-
ority” over the universal ummah (2003, 8). However, while investigating 
political involvement within the black community, Ihsan Bagby noticed a 
significant difference between the followers of Imam W. Deen Mohammed 
and those who seek to follow the Sunnah more closely: 93% of the former 
strongly agree that Muslims should be involved in politics, whereas only 
49% of the latter do (Bagby 2004, 14). 
The decision to withdraw from the political arena is further made mani-
fest by answers given to a question on the nation’s moral values. In 2001 
and 2011, respondents were asked whether they felt that American soci-
ety was immoral. The answers show that black mosque leaders are much 
more likely than other leaders to agree with that statement. In fact, dur-
ing this past decade, the percentage of African-American mosque leaders 
who believe that America is immoral increased from 39% to 48% while the 
number of immigrant leaders decreased from 20% to 12%. Meanwhile, on 
this question also, the contrast between the two largest African-American 
subgroups is similarly observable: 60% of Imam W. Deen Mohammed’s 
followers agree that America is immoral, compared to 83% of the more 
conservative branch (Bagby 2004, 8). In substance, the African-American 
Muslim group appears to be divided over issues of political implication as 
a result of differing perspectives on doctrinal rules. That being said, black 
leaders are overall more readily and openly critical of America than other 
leaders and because they tend to be better off, recent immigrants are more 
likely to express satisfaction with the state of the nation.
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Providing insights into how American Muslims define their political 
priorities, Bagby’s reports show that there are broader issues that further 
divide the constituency. When asked about their main political concern, 
immigrant Muslims report being more sensitive to foreign affairs. Their 
focus remains on their homelands and US foreign policy issues affecting 
the Islamic world such as the Palestine-Israel conflict, US sanctions against 
Iraq or engagement in Syria. In reaction, African-American Muslims have 
expressed their disapproval and disappointment. Such is Abdin Chande’s 
observation:
African-American Muslims cannot understand why immigrants send donations to all 
sorts of causes in other countries, forgetting to address the economic plight of their reli-
gious compatriots in the US. So, they do not  understand why prayers are addressed to 
God to ease the problems of Muslims […] in Iraq, whereas no mention is made of the 
problems of the inner city dwellers in the US to the total disregard of the reality of 
America. (2008, 77) 
In contrast, African-American Muslims generally tend to focus on domestic 
issues. For example, when asked whether they felt that their mosque “is 
working for social justice,” 87% of African-American Muslims answered 
positively compared to 71% of all mosques (Bagby 2001, 27). Similarly, 
another study by Ihsan Bagby in 2005 reveals that African-Americans 
give a higher priority to providing services to the congregants: services to 
Muslims are ranked fourth among Black participants as opposed to sev-
enth for Arabs (32). In many of the mosques attended by African-American 
Muslims, particular programs are designed to provide health care services, 
support for the destitute and other forms of assistance. In fine, structured 
inequalities and economic hardship appear to be the main focus of African-
American mosque activism. This divergence in concerns has obviously 
constrained the efforts made by community leaders to close the gap be-
tween the immigrant and indigenous communities. But it has also translated 
into differing voting patterns. Indeed, the analysis of recent voting behavior 
indicates that when going to the poll, subgroups do not form a consistent 
voting bloc. 
The hypothetical existence of a “Muslim lobby” was first extensively 
reported in the aftermath of the controversial 2000 presidential election. In 
seeking to identify those who had cast their ballot in favor of the Republican 
candidate, the New York Times, for example, indicated that: “A few hundred 
votes decided the election; an estimated 60,000 Muslims in Florida voted 
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for Bush” (Senzai 2004, 2). Once the results were settled and announced, 
Agha Saeed, the chairman of the American Muslim Political Coordination 
Council (AMPCC),6 further corroborated the theory and declared: “It won’t 
be long before political analysts realize that Muslim voters have played a 
historic role” (quoted in Unger 2004, 216). Although it is quite obvious 
that at the time Muslim activists sought to weld the community’s constitu-
ent parts into a unified voting bloc, more recent research shows that the 
situation was far more complex. In reality, while it is true that the political 
action committees of immigrant Muslims had endorsed George W. Bush 
before the election, a majority of African-American Muslims actually gave 
their vote to the Democratic candidate Al Gore. The key reason for this 
disagreement was the fact that, aside from being a devout orthodox Jew, 
Gore’s vice-presidential nominee Joseph Lieberman had expressed pro-Is-
rael sentiments in public debates. So his presence on the Democratic ticket 
did not make Al Gore an acceptable choice for those American Muslims of 
Middle-Eastern descent. As a result, in the Detroit Metro Area for example, 
74% of Arab Muslims threw their support behind George W. Bush while the 
majority of native-born black Muslims voted, as most African-Americans 
have done for decades, for the Democratic candidate (Jamal 2005, 541).
Thus, the existence of a so-called “Muslim lobby” ought to be reconsid-
ered or used with great care. Indeed, formulating a united political platform 
between immigrant and indigenous Muslims in general has turned out to 
be a major bone of contention. Clearly, homeland politics or foreign policy 
are subjects that affect voting trends, and historical trajectories or inherited 
loyalties continue to shape attitudes. Although countering the daily stereo-
typing of Muslims in the media and public discourse has taken center stage 
in US Muslim activism, the lack of a unified socio-political platform has 
hampered the community’s efforts toward a collective agenda and its ef-
fectiveness in defining a more inclusive identity.
Conclusion
On a television appearance in November 2015, Representative Keith El-
lison, one of two Muslims in the US Congress, argued that American 
Muslims needed to assert their “Muslim Americanness” and thus con-
6 The AMPCC was a short-lived umbrella organization founded during the 2000 presidential election cam-
paign to act as a nationwide and united lobbying force.
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firm their sense of belonging and adherence to national cohesion (Kopan 
2015, 1).
However, this study has revealed that when identity options are selected 
and hierarchized, intra-communal dynamics may lead to separate congre-
gations of racial subgroups. Race relations as they have evolved in the US 
greatly affect the visibility and political stances of the Muslim population. 
In times of hostility, community leaders strive to delineate clear boundaries 
and establish their own overarching constituency in order to counter the in-
creasing influence of Islamophobia. But because the black-white racial bi-
nary is so firmly rooted, the coming together of the various socio-economic 
groups is rendered virtually impossible. 
My analysis of Ihsa Bagby’s reports further shows that between 2001 
and 2011 the gap widened between the Arab and indigenous subgroups. It 
indicates that the fragmentation which was underway before the 9/11 ter-
rorist attacks has continued despite the leadership’s call for unity. In fact, 
in a curious paradox, some black Muslims are now espousing a new form 
of nativism to preserve the legacy of the African-American experience in 
North America and promote their legitimacy as genuine Muslims. At the 
same time, immigrants, and Middle-Easterners specifically, have made lit-
tle progress in their move away from parochialism. Hence it appears that, 
although inequalities are fundamentally socio-economic, the concerted ref-
erence to a canonical faith or the adoption of long-established racial preju-
dices has made social progress and equality more difficult to attain between 
subgroups.
Ultimately, the very particular histories of African-Americans and Arab 
immigrants and distinct relations vis-à-vis American whiteness make clear 
the limits of ummah ideals in a society still struggling with race and class 
inequalities. When asked about the present state of the American Muslim 
community, one African-American leader conceded: “We are a family. But 
a very dysfunctional family” (Saafir 2016).
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